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Abstract
The problem of detecting face spoofing attacks (presen-
tation attacks) has recently gained a well-deserved popu-
larity. Mainly focusing on 2D attacks forged by displaying
printed photos or replaying recorded videos on mobile de-
vices, a significant portion of these studies ground their ar-
guments on the flatness of the spoofing material in front of
the sensor. In this paper, we inspect the spoofing potential
of subject-specific 3D facial masks for 2D face recognition.
Additionally, we analyze Local Binary Patterns based coun-
termeasures using both color and depth data, obtained by
Kinect. For this purpose, we introduce the 3D Mask Attack
Database (3DMAD), the first publicly available 3D spoof-
ing database, recorded with a low-cost depth camera. Ex-
tensive experiments on 3DMAD show that easily attainable
facial masks can pose a serious threat to 2D face recog-
nition systems and LBP is a powerful weapon to eliminate
it.
1. Introduction
With growing populations and their increasing mobil-
ity, recognition of humans using biological characteristics
becomes a promising solution for identity management.
Among many reliable biometric traits, face is a very pop-
ular one and it owes this reputation mainly to its accessi-
bility. But unfortunately, this gift can also be a curse in
malicious circumstances, enabling attackers to easily create
copies and spoof face recognition systems. Spoofing is an
attempt to gain authentication through a biometric system
by presenting a counterfeit evidence of a valid user [14].
This vulnerability of face has evoked significant atten-
tion in the biometric community and numerous papers have
been published in countermeasure studies [14]. For a thor-
ough and reproducible analysis of several methods and
available public databases, readers can refer to [2, 4].
Due to their convenience and low-cost, the most com-
mon types of spoofing methods being focused are photo and
video attacks. Proposed anti-spoofing approaches against
these attacks can be broadly classified into three groups:
liveness detection, motion analysis and texture analysis.
The first group aims to detect liveness of face, based on
live-face specific movements such as eye blinking [16] or
lip movements [5]. The second group of approaches ana-
lyze the motion in the scene and expose spoofing attacks
by examining the way the objects move in front of the sen-
sor. The movements of planar objects like papers or screens
differ greatly from those of a real face. For this reason,
in [9], the trajectories of small regions in face images are
analyzed and classified as real or fake. Similarly in [7], a
set of facial points are located automatically and their ge-
ometric invariants are utilized to detect attacks. Finally, in
the third group of methods, the texture of the face image
is examined to find spoofing clues like printing artifacts [3]
and/or blurring [12]. Alternatively, micro-texture analysis is
also applicable as proposed in a recent paper [13] in which
multi-scale local binary patterns (LBP) are utilized.
A substantial portion of these approaches for 2D anti-
spoofing are rendered inoperative when 3D facial masks are
introduced for attacks. For instance in [10], it is shown that
a liveness detection system relying on eye-blinking and lip
movements can be defeated by simply using photographic
masks which are actually high resolution facial prints worn
on face with eyes and mouth regions cut out. A similar
conclusion is also made in [21]. On the other side, motion-
based countermeasures that depend on the shape difference
between real and fake faces are not able to operate as in-
tended when the photos or screens are replaced by facial
masks. Even employing additional sensors as suggested in
the study by Tsalakanidou et al. [18], for which a 3D cam-
era is utilized to localize face and test its ”face-ness”, would
become futile in this scenario.
In conclusion, it is clear that 3D masks introduce new
challenges to face anti-spoofing domain. To our knowledge,
very few studies have been published addressing them.
2. Related work
The work of Kim et al. [8] can be listed as one of the first
papers published in mask anti-spoofing. It aims to distin-
guish between the facial skin and mask materials by exploit-
ing the fact that their reflectance should be different. For
this purpose, the distribution of albedo values for illumina-
tion at various wavelengths are analyzed to see how differ-
ent facial skins and mask materials (silicon, latex, or skin-
jell) behave in reflectance. As a result, a 2D feature vector
consisting of 2 radiance measurements under 850 and 685
nm illuminations is selected to be classified via Fisher’s lin-
ear discriminant. The proposed method is reported to have
97.78% accuracy in fake face detection. In that paper, the
experiments are done directly on the mask materials instead
of real masks and hence, spoofing performances are not in-
cluded. Additionally, for mask detection, the measurements
are required to be done at exactly 30cm and on the forehead
region. The occlusion possibility in the forehead together
with range limitations makes the method quite impractical.
Similarly in [21], multi-spectral analysis is proposed
claiming that fake, by its definition, is indistinguishable for
human eyes and therefore, it is not possible to detect attacks
using only visual face images. After measuring the albedo
curves of facial skin and mask materials with varying dis-
tances, two discriminative wavelengths (850 and 1450 nm)
are selected. Finally, an SVM classifier is trained to dis-
criminate between genuine and fake attempts. Experiments
are conducted on a database of 20 masks of different ma-
terials: 4 plastic, 6 silica gel, 4 paper pulp, 4 plaster and
2 sponge. The results show that the method can achieve
89.18% accuracy. Eliminating the range limitation and ex-
perimenting on real facial masks, the authors bring the state
of the art one step further, but still no analysis of how well
the spoofing attacks work is presented.
These two papers handle the mask attacks in an evasion
context rather than spoofing. They don’t examine masks
that are replicas of real subjects to be impersonated. Con-
trarily, in [11], Kose et al. work on a mask database which
consists of printed masks of 16 real subjects. For this pur-
pose, the scans of subjects were acquired by a 3D scanner
and the masks were manufactured using a 3D printing ser-
vice. In addition to texture images, the database also in-
cludes range images for both real and fake samples. The
authors propose to apply an LBP-based method [13] on both
color and depth channels and claim 88.12% and 86% accu-
racy, respectively. This study has two main shortcomings:
Firstly, although they have the means to do so, the authors
unfortunately do not report on the spoofing performances of
the printed masks. To certify the alleged threat is nearly as
important as to counter it. Secondly and more importantly,
the utilized database is not public, posing a barrier to com-
parative and reproducible research.
In our paper, we have two main purposes:
• Introducing a public database, called 3D Mask Attack
Database (3DMAD), along with a baseline analysis on
its spoofing performance against 2D face recognition
• Studying the effectiveness of Local Binary Patterns
(LBP) based features extracted from color and depth
images to detect the mask attacks
For reproducibility purposes, both the database1 and the
source code2 to generate the reported results are made freely
available to public use.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section
3, 3DMAD database is described in detail. In Section 4, the
studied countermeasure techniques are explained. Experi-
mental results on 3DMAD for both its capability of deceiv-
ing a 2D face recognition system and anti-spoofing perfor-
mances of the LBP-based methods are provided in Section
5. Finally, in Section 6, the paper is concluded with remarks
on future work.
3. The 3D-MAD database
The 3D Mask Attack Database (3DMAD) is mainly
composed of real access and mask attack videos of 17 dif-
ferent subjects recorded by Microsoft Kinect sensor. In the
following subsections, the database recording is explained
in detail and the baseline 2D face recognition algorithm im-
plemented to evaluate the mask spoofing performances is
presented.
3.1. 3D mask manufacturing
In [20] Zhang et al. state that massive usage of masks
does not exist in the literature, mainly due to the fact that it
is too expensive to produce client-like masks. This was very
true until recently when 3D printing services have sprung
up. It has become a market of high potential and is expected
to continue growing rapidly.
Among many available options, ThatsMyFace.com
stands out with its specialization in facial reconstruction and
in transforming 2D portraiture into 3D sculptures. Only af-
ter seconds of uploading frontal and profile face images of a
person, the constructed 3D face is displayed for inspection.
If satisfied, it is printed and delivered to your mailbox in
several forms such as a head on an action figure or a wear-
able life-size mask in hard resin or a paper-cut file.
The advantage of this service over the others is the pos-
sibility of utilizing facial images to create a 3D model. Reg-
ular 3D printing services like the one used to create the
database in [11] require the 3D models to be obtained by the
user and uploaded to their system to be printed. Whilst the
advancements in 3D scanner technologies are remarkable,
they still have range limitations and require user coopera-
tion. For this reason, obtaining proper 3D data from a dis-
tance and from unaware subjects is highly unrealistic. On
the other hand, photographs of the users can be easily cap-
tured form a distance or obtained via Internet, e.g. through
social networks.
1www.idiap.ch/dataset/3dmad
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Figure 1. 17 facial masks obtained from ThatsMyFace.com
For our database, we uploaded one frontal and two pro-
file images of 17 different subjects on ThatsMyFace.com
and ordered a life-size wearable mask and a paper-cut
mask for each. The uploaded images and the paper-cut
masks are also accessible in the database but they are not
included in this paper. The 17 wearable masks made out of
a hard resin composite in full 24-bit color with holes at the
eyes and the nostrils are shown in Figure 1.
The size of the database is limited to 17 subjects due to
the high cost of the 3D facial masks. On the other hand,
more samples can always be collected from the same masks
and additionally, it is possible for everyone to extend it us-
ing the available paper-cut files.
3.2. Recording settings
For the dataset, all recordings are done using Microsoft
Kinect for Xbox 360. This sensor provides both RGB (8-
bit) and depth data (11-bit) of size 640 × 480 at 30 frames
per second. The reason behind this selection is two-fold.
Firstly, with the available depth images, it is made possi-
ble to explore attacks and devise countermeasures using 3D
information. Secondly, it would be interesting to explore
the vulnerability of 3D face recognition systems to mask
attacks as a future extension to this work.
The videos are collected in three different sessions: Two
real-access sessions held two weeks apart and a third ses-
sion in which mask attacks are performed by a single oper-
ator (attacker). In each session and for each person, 5 videos
of 10 seconds length are captured. In total, 255 color and
depth videos of 300 frames are recorded.
The recording conditions for all three sessions are well-
controlled: The background of the scene is uniform and the
lighting is adjusted to minimize the shadows cast on the
face. Three sample frames from three sessions for the same
subject can be seen in Figure 2. Additionally, eye positions
for each video are included in the database which are anno-
tated manually at every 60th frame and linearly interpolated
for the rest.
Figure 2. Flowchart for the analyzed methods including sample
frames from three different sessions for a subject. The first two
are real access samples, while in the third, an attacker is wearing
the subject’s mask.
3.3. Baseline face recognition algorithm
For completeness, it is necessary to evaluate the spoofing
performance of 3D masks on a 2D face recognition system.
To this end, Inter Session Variability modeling (ISV) [19]
method is implemented as the baseline face recognition al-
gorithm. ISV is an extension of the Gaussian Mixture Mod-
els (GMM) approach which estimates more reliable client
models by explicitly modeling and removing within-client
variations. The identity models are adapted from a Univer-
sal Background Model (UBM) and built on Discrete Cosine
Transform (DCT) block features.
The recognition tests are done on still images. Specif-
ically, 10 evenly distributed frames are taken from each
video. The utilized protocol and obtained results are de-
tailed in Experiments section.
4. LBP-based countermeasures to spoofing
As explained previously, liveness detection and motion
analysis methods are bound to fail in detecting 3D mask
attacks. This leaves us with one reliable approach which is
texture analysis. The fact that human skin differs from mask
material with its optical characteristics, such as reflectance,
scattering etc. makes it possible to use texture properties to
discriminate between real accesses and spoof attacks.
Local Binary Pattern (LBP) [15] and its variations have
been proven to be successful in both 2D and 3D face spoof-
ing attacks [6, 11, 13]. In this study, we aim to analyze
the discriminative properties of texture features extracted
by various LBP operators in ’real face’ / ’3D mask’ clas-
sification using the proposed MAD3D database.
Similar to recognition tests, each frame of each video is
processed separately to extract the LBP histograms. But
differently, the countermeasure analysis is performed per
video. To this end, means of all histograms from each video
are computed and classification experiments are done on
those averaged features.
Figure 3. Color (1st row) and depth (2nd row) images after pre-
processing. Real access (columns 1 and 3) and mask attack
(columns 2 and 4) samples are compared for two subjects.
4.1. Feature extraction by LBP
Basic LBP value for a pixel is computed as a binary num-
ber by comparing the intensity of that pixel to the intensi-
ties of the adjacent pixels in 3× 3 neighborhood (LBP3×3).
The histogram of these 28 different labels is then used as a
feature vector. In an extension called uniform patterns, the
vector length is reduced to 59 by eliminating patterns with
more than two bitwise transitions (LBPu23×3 - shortly LBP).
In our experiments, along with LBP, three more ex-
tensions from [17] are evaluated: transitional (tLBP),
direction-coded (dLBP) and modified (mLBP). The tLBP
compares two consecutive neighboring pixels circularly in
clock-wise direction. The dLBP compares four adjacent
pixels only but also includes the direction information in
an extra bit. Finally, mLBP compares the pixels in 3 × 3
neighborhood to their average instead of the center pixel.
Furthermore, we assess the influence of dividing the face
images into blocks. For each LBP type, the image is broken
into 3×3 blocks, the LBP histograms are calculated for each
block separately and concatenated to form the final feature
vector. In [13], block processing methodology is reported
to improve the performance significantly. On the contrary,
it is concluded to be ineffectual in [6].
4.2. Classification
The feature vectors extracted are LBP histograms, so
firstly χ2 histogram matching is applied to compare test
samples with a reference histogram which is simply calcu-
lated by taking the average of all real access samples in the
training set.
Additionally, two more complex classifiers are tested;
one being linear and the other non-linear. For linear clas-
sification, Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) is adopted.
Before computing the scores for the extracted features, Prin-
cipal Component Analysis (PCA) is applied for dimension-
ality reduction in which 99% of the energy is preserved. Fi-
nally for non-linear classification, Support Vector Machine
(SVM) with radial kernel basis function is employed.
Impostor scores
Genuine Scores
Mask attack scores
Figure 4. Score distributions of genuine and impostor scores on the
development set and mask attack scores on the test set of 3DMAD
using ISV for 2D face verification
5. Experiments
Firstly all color and depth frames in the database are pre-
processed; i.e. converted to gray-scale, then cropped and
normalized to 64 × 64 (similarly to [6]) using the anno-
tated eye positions. Resulting sample images are given in
Figure 3. All experiments are realized using the free signal-
processing and machine learning toolbox Bob3 [1].
5.1. Protocol
The subjects in the database are divided into 3 randomly
chosen non-overlapping sets for training, development and
testing. Number of identities assigned for each set are 7, 5
and 5, respectively. While experimenting on the database, it
is recommended that training (e.g. for parameter optimiza-
tion, building universal models) is done with training and
development sets, if needed. The test set should be solely
used to report performances.
An additional protocol is defined to measure the vul-
nerability to spoofing for which the development and test
sets are further divided into enrollment and probe partitions.
While the first sessions are assigned as enrolled gallery sam-
ples, the second and third sessions are used for real and
mask probing, respectively.
5.2. Spoofing performance of 3D masks
For this experiment, a verification scenario is assumed.
After the Universal Background Model is created using the
training set, match scores are generated on the probe parti-
tions of development and test sets. The Equal Error Rate
(EER) threshold is calculated on the development set as
the decision threshold for verification. With this setting,
65.70% of the mask attack attempts in the test set are in-
correctly classified as clients. This Spoof False Acceptance
Rate (SFAR) validates the mask attacks in 3DMAD as suc-
cessful spoofing attempts against 2D face recognition.
The false acceptance rate (FAR) at the same threshold
would increase from 1.06% to 13.99% if mask attacks are
included in the probe partition together with the zero-effort
3www.idiap.ch/software/bob
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Figure 5. The HTERs of four different LBP types applied per-image (I) and per-block (B) for color and depth images are presented with
error bars, where the uncertainties are indicated by standard deviations.
impostor probes. In Figure 4, the score distribution of the
mask attacks on the test set is displayed together with the
score distributions of genuine clients and impostors on the
development set.
The multiple peaks in the mask scores are due to differ-
ent spoofing capabilities of different masks. This may be
affected by the accuracy of the reconstructed 3D model as
well as the subject himself.
5.3. Anti-spoofing performances of LBP
Features are extracted for all four LBP types with and
without the block-based approach. This results in 8 differ-
ent sets of features for both color and depth data.
After the classifiers are trained using the training set,
the scores are computed for both development and test sets.
Since the purpose of the system is binary classification, two
types of errors exist: False Fake where the real accesses are
classified as mask attacks (FFR) and False Living where the
mask attacks are classified as real accesses (FLR). The per-
formances are measured with Half Total Error Rate (HTER)
which is the average of this two error rates.
HTERs are calculated at the EER threshold computed on
the development set. This threshold is the point along the
Receiver Operating Characteristic curve where FFR is equal
to FLR.
Due to considerable performance differences among 3D
masks, 1000-fold cross validation method is adopted for
evaluation. For each fold, the client ids in the database are
randomly assigned into one one of the training, develop-
ment and test sets, respecting their initial sizes. At the end,
the error rates are averaged. For reproducibility of the re-
sults, a random seed is used to initialize the pseudo-random
number generator.
The HTER rates of four different LBP-based methods
applied per-image (I) and per-block (B) for both develop-
ment and test sets are presented in Figure 5 for color and
depth images.
If we look at the impact of the block division first, the
results show that it improves the results remarkably almost
in all settings, except the χ2 classification for depth maps.
For all types of LBP features extracted from range images,
per-image approach gives better results when χ2 is used.
For the classification techniques, in general LDA yields
to better performances for both color and depth features.
The exceptions occur when LBP and mLBP features are
extracted from depth images without using blocks. In those
cases, SVM marginally draws ahead of LDA.
Finally, the experiments reveal that it is not easy to pick
one method among four LBP types, giving best results for
all different settings. For the color images, LBP performs
better than the rest with LDA and SVM classifiers, whereas
with χ2 dLBP overcomes. For the depth images, with χ2
and LDA, tLBP gives smaller errors in average. On the
other hand for SVM, mLBP is better.
Results on this database suggest a general trend that clas-
sification of block-based LBP features with LDA gives best
results with both color and depth images, for which the
HTER values are found to be 0.95% and 1.27%, respec-
tively.
6. Conclusion
Utilization of 3D masks in spoofing attacks becomes eas-
ier / cheaper each day with the advancements in 3D printing
technology. In this paper, we aim to contribute to the current
state of research in this domain; by presenting a novel pub-
lic database of 3D mask attacks accompanied by protocols
and a baseline 2D face recognition system that is proved to
be vulnerable to those attacks, and by giving an analysis on
various LBP-based anti-spoofing methods using color and
depth images obtained from Kinect. The experimental re-
sults generally suggest that for both data types, LDA clas-
sification of block-based extracted uniform LBP features is
more accurate in mask detection.
For the sake of reproducible research, the source code is
made publicly available, together with the database and its
protocols. A possible extension to this work is to explore
the spoofing performances in 3D face recognition systems
and to devise methods to detect attacks using pure 3D data,
instead of 2.5D. Additionally, further investigation can be
done on spoofing the spoofing potential of each mask sepa-
rately.
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